Principles of Comparative Politics 3rd Edition Golder Test Bank

1. Part I. What is Comparative Politics?
2. 1. Introduction
3. Overview of the Book
4. State Failure
5. Economic Determinants of Democracy
6. Cultural Determinants of Democracy
7. What’s So Good about Democracy Anyway?
8. Institutional Design
9. The Approach Taken in This Book
10. Key Concepts
11. 2. What is Science?
12. What is Science?
13. The Scientific Method
14. Step 1: Question
15. Step 2: Theory or Model
16. Step 3: Implications (Hypotheses)
17. Step 4: Observe the World (Test Hypotheses)
18. Step 5: Evaluation
19. An Introduction to Logic
20. Valid and Invalid Arguments
21. Testing Theories
22. Myths about Science
23. Conclusion
24. Key Concepts
25. Problems
26. 3. What is Politics?
27. The Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Game
28. Solving the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Game
29. Evaluating the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Game
30. Conclusion
31. Key Concepts
32. Preparation for the Problems
33. Problems
34. Part II. The Modern State: Democracy or Dictatorship?
35. 4. The Origins of the Modern State
36. What is a State?
37. Somalia and Syria: Two Failed States
38. Somalia
39. Syria
40. How Unusual Are Somalia and Syria?
41. The Contractarian View of the State
42. The State of Nature
43. Solving the State of Nature Game
44. Civil Society and the Social Contract
45. The Predatory View of the State
46. Conclusion
47. Key Concepts
48. Preparation for the Problems
49. Problems
50. 5. Democracy and Dictatorship: Conceptualization and Measurement
51. Democracy and Dictatorship in Historical Perspective
52. Classifying Democracies and Dictatorships
53. Dahl’s View of Democracy and Dictatorship
54. Three Measures of Democracy and Dictatorship
55. Evaluating Measures of Democracy and Dictatorship
56. Conclusion
57. Key Concepts
58. Problems
59. 6. The Economic Determinants of Democracy and Dictatorship
60. Classic Modernization Theory
61. A Variant of Modernization Theory
62. Economic Development and Democracy
63. Natural Resources and Democracy
64. Foreign Aid and Democracy
65. Inequality and Democracy
66. Economic Performance
67. Some More Empirical Evidence
68. Conclusion
69. Key Concepts
70. Appendix: An Intuitive Take on Statistical Analyses
71. Problems
72. 7. The Cultural Determinants of Democracy and Dictatorship
73. Classical Cultural Arguments: Mill and Montesquieu
74. Does Democracy Require a Civic Culture?
75. Surveys and Comparative Research
76. Religion and Democracy
77. Are Some Religions Incompatible with Democracy?
78. Some Empirical Evidence
79. Are Some Religions Incompatible with Democracy? A New Test
80. Experiments and Culture
81. Conclusion
82. Key Concepts
83. Problems
84. 8. Democratic Transitions
85. Bottom-Up Transitions to Democracy
86. East Germany 1989
87. Collective Action Theory
88. Tipping Models
89. Top-Down Transitions to Democracy
90. A Game-Theoretic Model of Top-Down Transitions
91. Applying the Transition Game to Poland
92. Conclusion
93. Key Concepts
94. Problems
95. 9. Democracy or Dictatorship: Does It Make a Difference?
96. The Effect of Regime Type on Economic Growth
97. Property Rights
98. Consumption versus Investment
99. Autonomy from Special Interests
100. Evidence
101. The Effect of Regime Type on Government Performance
102. Conclusion
103. Key Concepts
104. Problems
105. Part III. Varieties of Democracy and Dictatorship
106. 10. Varieties of Dictatorship
107. A Common Typology of Authoritarian Regimes
108. A Three-Way Classification: Monarchy, Military, Civilian
109. Monarchic Dictatorships
110. Military Dictatorships
111. Civilian Dictatorships
112. The Two Fundamental Problems of Authoritarian Rule
113. The Problem of Authoritarian Power-Sharing
114. The Problem of Authoritarian Control
115. Selectorate Theory
116. Institutions
117. Mapping W and S onto a Typology of Regimes
118. Government Performance
119. Conclusion
120. Key Concepts
121. Problems
122. 11. Problems with Group Decision Making
123. Problems with Group Decision Making
124. Majority Rule and Condorcet’s Paradox
125. The Borda Count and the Reversal Paradox
126. Majority Rule with an Agenda Setter
127. Restrictions on Preferences: The Median Voter Theorem
128. Arrow’s Theorem
129. Arrow’s Fairness Conditions
130. Conclusion
131. Key Concepts
132. Appendix: Stability in Two-Dimensional Majority-Rule Voting
133. Problems
134. 12. Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Democracies
135. Classifying Democracies
136. Is the Government Responsible to the Elected Legislature?
137. Is the Head of State Popularly Elected for a Fixed Term?
138. An Overview
139. Making and Breaking Governments in Parliamentary Democracies
140. The Government
141. Government Formation Process
142. A Simple Model of Government Formation
143. Different Types of Government
144. Duration of Governments: Formation and Survival
145. Making and Breaking Governments in Presidential Democracies
146. Government Formation Process
147. Types of Presidential Cabinets
148. The Composition of Presidential Cabinets
149. Making and Breaking Governments in Semi-Presidential Democracies
150. A Unifying Framework: Principal-Agent and Delegation Problems
151. Conclusion
152. Key Concepts
153. Problems
154. 13. Elections and Electoral Systems
155. Elections and Electoral Integrity
156. Electoral Integrity: An Overview
157. Electoral Integrity in Four Countries
158. The Determinants of Electoral Integrity
159. Electoral Systems
160. Majoritarian Electoral Systems
161. Proportional Electoral Systems
162. Mixed Electoral Systems
163. Legislative Electoral System Choice
164. Conclusion
165. Key Concepts
166. Problems
167. 14. Social Cleavages and Party Systems
168. Political Parties: What Are They, and What Do They Do?
169. Political Parties Structure the Political World
170. Recruitment and Socialization of the Political Elite
171. Mobilization of the Masses
172. A Link between the Rulers and the Ruled
173. Party Systems
174. Where Do Parties Come From?
175. Types of Parties: Social Cleavages and Political Identity Formation
176. Origins of the British Party System
177. Social Cleavages
178. Theorizing about Politicized Cleavages
179. Number of Parties: Duverger’s Theory
180. Social Cleavages
181. Electoral Institutions
182. The Mechanical Effect of Electoral Laws
183. The Strategic Effect of Electoral Laws
184. Summarizing Duverger’s Theory
185. Conclusion
186. Key Concepts
187. Problems
188. 15. Institutional Veto Players
189. Federalism
190. Federalism: Federalism in Structure
191. Decentralization: Federalism in Practice
192. Why Federalism?
193. Bicameralism
194. Types of Bicameralism
195. Why Bicameralism?
196. Constitutionalism
197. The Shift to a New Constitutionalism
198. Different Systems of Constitutional Justice
199. Veto Players
200. Conclusion
201. Key Concepts
202. Problems
203. Part IV. Varieties of Democracy and Political Outcomes
204. 16. Consequences of Democratic Institutions
205. Majoritarian or Consensus Democracy?
206. Two Visions of Democracy
207. Majoritarian and Consensus Institutions
208. Political Representation
209. The Effect of Political Institutions on Fiscal Policy
210. Economic and Cultural Determinants of Fiscal Policy
211. Electoral Laws and Fiscal Policy
212. Summary
213. Electoral Laws, Federalism, and Ethnic Conflict
214. Ethnic Diversity and Conflict
215. Electoral Laws and Ethnic Conflict
216. Federalism and Ethnic Conflict
217. Presidentialism and Democratic Survival
218. The Perils of Presidentialism
219. The Difficult Combination: Presidentialism and Multipartism
220. Summary
221. Conclusion
222. Key Concepts
223. Problems
224. References
225. Index

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